Trading privacy for security by Hoven van Genderen, R. van den
 
 
TRADING PRIVACY FOR SECURITY 
 
Rob van den Hoven van Genderen∗ 
 
 
“The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of 
the crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow 
through it; the storms may enter; the rain may enter – but the king of 
England cannot enter; all his forces dare not cross the threshold of the 
ruined tenement” (William Pitt, English Parliamentarian, 1765). 
 
 
Introduction 
Privacy is one of the most personal human rights, for it includes all aspects 
of personal life and behaviour. In our current information society this 
personal information is used by private and public parties as a ‘natural 
resource’ for commercial and public policy activities.  Certainly in the areas 
with perceived ‘threats to society’, authorities seem to have little hesitance to 
use this personal information. Under most circumstances the privacy right of 
the individual is considered to be outweighed by the general interest.  But 
even the data-subjects themselves do think that privacy is of less importance 
than protection against perceived terrorist threats. 
 
The concept of private property seems to be the source of all integrity of 
private possessions, including the inviolability of body and soul. Locke stated 
that the state’s only reason of existence was its function to protect life, liberty 
and estate, and would only be justified if this purpose could be fulfilled. 
According to the International Court of Justice,  
 
“the jurisdiction of a State is exclusive within the limits fixed by 
international law – using this expression in its wider sense, that is to 
say, embracing both customary law and general as well as particular 
treaty law”.1  
 
Therefore, State sovereignty must be interpreted in view of, and combined 
with, general principles of international law such as the general prohibition of 
abuses of rights, proportionality, respect of other States’ sovereignty, due 
diligence, ‘minimum standards of civilisation’, et cetera.2 Although these 
principles are considered to form the basis of any national or international 
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legal system, the actual application and definition has been a constant subject 
of discussion.2 
 
In our changing society there is a tendency by governmental authorities to 
hold control over information and personal data streams, and to combine all 
informational sources to a single point of entrance. There is an increasing 
need to define limits to the use of personal data by national and international 
regulatory standards. In Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) it is stated that: “Everyone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence.” As the second 
paragraph indicates, this right is not absolute:  
 
“There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise 
of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, 
public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, on the waves of (perceived) 
terrorism, the fundamental rights laid down in international treaties are often 
restricted. The international human rights treaties contain ‘escape clauses’ 
that allow sovereign states to restrict fundamental rights if there are justified 
circumstances to do so.  These circumstances are ambiguous and are 
certainly not clearly defined in either national or international regulation. 
Article 8 of the ECHR is also applicable to actions of justice or the national 
security agencies, but who is controlling them? 
 
I. Extension of Data Processing by Authorities 
We see an increasing adaptation of ‘conventional’ crime to cybercrime, 
including international terrorism because of the digitalisation, convergence of 
technologies and globalisation of Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT). Traditional measures of investigation by police and 
judicial authorities such as surveillance and tapping of electronic 
communication do not fit to these changes. Therefore special procedures 
need to be developed, such as ‘data mining’ and digitalised analysis of 
personal behaviour by profiling techniques. The criminal  actors are using 
those techniques as well to commit their crimes and acts of terrorism, and 
thus we must be prepared to use similar means to combat the criminal 
actions. 
 
                                                
3 The municipal codes of well over a dozen countries expressly provide for the application 
of the general principles of law in the absence of specific legal provisions or of custom, and 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice stipulates that ‘the general principles of law 
recognised by civilised nations’ constitute one of the sources of international law to be 
applied by the Court; but the exact meaning and scope of this section of the Statute have 
always been a subject of controversy amongst international lawyers; see B. Cheng, General 
Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, London: University College 
2006. 
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As stated in the explanatory report on the Convention on Cybercrime: 
 
“The new technologies challenge existing legal concepts. Information 
and communications flow more easily around the world. Borders are 
no longer boundaries to this flow. Criminals are increasingly located in 
places other than where their acts produce their effects. However, 
domestic laws are generally confined to a specific territory. Thus 
solutions to the problems posed must be addressed by international 
law, necessitating the adoption of adequate international legal 
instruments. The present Convention aims to meet this challenge, with 
due respect to human rights in the new Information Society.” 4 
 
II. Cybercrime 
Due to the international nature of crimes as acts of terrorism, international 
co-ordinated investigations and the use of personal data must be made 
possible. However, a sharp eye must be kept on their limitations in the 
interest of human rights, and specifically the protection of the privacy of 
individuals which takes into account the evolution of data availability. 
 
The key questions to confront are: how can the tension between privacy 
protection and criminal investigation and measures of protecting state 
security be resolved in an acceptable way, and what adaptations to the 
existing regulatory framework are needed? 
 
The Cybercrime Convention5 states that the actions of police and justice 
should be governed by restrictive measures based on the privacy concerns. 
Member States shall “incorporate the principle of proportionality.” 
Proportionality shall be implemented by each Party in accordance with 
relevant principles of its domestic law. For European countries, this will be 
derived from the principles of the 1950 Council of Europe Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the relevant 
case law from the European Court of Justice, and national legislation and 
case law. The power or procedure shall be proportional to the nature and 
circumstances of the offence. 
 
The question is how the nature and circumstances of the offence are weighed 
and by whom? What measures can be taken by governmental and police 
authorities to restrain this development in a way that will preserve existing 
privacy rights? To what extent are authorities free to use personal data and 
from what sources? There is publicly available data from the Internet and 
other public sources, but also data acquired in the execution of public tasks, 
often available in governmental databases. Are criminal investigators and 
security agencies allowed to use the data in the same or a more inquisitive 
way than other governmental authorities, and should exchange by 
                                                
4 Convention on Cybercrime 2001. 
5 Convention on Cybercrime 2001, explanatory report, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/185.htm ETS (accessed on 31 
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governmental agencies be allowed? Under what circumstances and to what 
extent should this be possible? Can laws be specified in such a way that the 
balance between different purposes in protection of privacy as a fundamental 
right on one hand, and the protection of state integrity as protector of 
national interest on the other, is preserved? 
 
III. Terrorist Threats as Lever for Increasing Competences for the 
National Intelligence Agency 
 
The European Convention on Prevention of Terrorism states in Article 12:  
 
“Each Party shall ensure that the establishment, implementation and 
application of the criminalisation under Articles 5 to 7 and 9 of this 
Convention are carried out while respecting human rights obligations, 
in particular the right to freedom of expression, freedom of association 
and freedom of religion, as set forth in, where applicable to that Party, 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
and other obligations under international law.”6  
 
It is striking and illustrative that privacy is not listed as one of the human 
rights that can limit actions against terrorism. 
 
An interesting example can be found in the Dutch government report on 
information for the national intelligence agencies: Data for Decisiveness (data 
voor daadkracht) citing a Dutch poet from the early 19th century: “Although 
we do not know the reason, it probably has been a good one”.7 This was a 
means of indicating that we are expected to place our trust in the 
government, whatever they are doing with our personal data. According to 
this report, the enormous growth of databases and communication media, as 
well as the development of advanced technology to search, gives ample 
opportunity to intelligence agencies to realise their goals. 
 
In a study by Privacy International8 many European states are not considered 
capable of upholding human rights standards on privacy. Only Greece is 
considered to have significant protection and safeguards. The Netherlands’ 
                                                
6 Article 12 of the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, 
Warsaw, 2005 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/196.htm (accessed on 
31 August 2009); also, see second paragraph: “The establishment, implementation and 
application of the criminalisation under Articles 5 to 7 and 9 of this Convention should 
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aims pursued and to their necessity in a democratic society, and should exclude any form of 
arbitrariness or discriminatory or racist treatment.” 
7 Translated from Dutch “Al weten wij de reden niet ‘t Is vast op goeden grond geschied.”, 
Report, Commissie  Datastromenen Veiligheid, August 2007, citing A.C.W. Staring, De 
Hoofdige Boer, 1820), Gegevensbestanden voor veiligheid: observaties en analyse. 
Rapport van de Adviescommissie Informatiestromen Veiligheid, NCTb, 2007, p.25. 
8 ‘Leading surveillance societies in the EU and the World 2007’, 28 December 2007. 
www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-559597 (accessed on 31 
August 2009). 
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Minister of Justice, Hirsch Ballin, stated on 30 November 2007 that security 
and privacy are equally codified in Articles 5 and 8 of the ECHR, not being 
absolute rights, but open to interference of authorities when needed.9 
 
The effect of (terrorist) cybercrime can span the globe and one could argue 
that therefore harsher measures and extended competences have become a 
necessity. The complexity, and thus the difficulty in defining ‘new criminal 
acts’, may stand in the way of providing a clear description of the criminal 
conduct, its effects, and the (number of) perpetrators. 
 
As stated by Ulrich Sieber: 
 
“The new risks are combined with a high complexity of offences that 
do not rest on technical or scientifical causes, but on specific 
perpetrator structures, a high number of victims or a high geographical 
expansion and extensiveness of the perpetration of the crime.”10 
 
Considering the subject of, electronic (supported) crime, national security 
and the instruments for investigation, one could conclude that there is no 
clear distinction between criminal acts, criminals and other (connected) 
persons. How should we apply criminal law under such circumstances? 
Sieber speaks of the “delimitation of criminal law and new security law”, a 
dangerous development for the enforcement of fundamental human rights, 
in particular privacy.   
 
IV. Temptation for Authorities 
The large quantity of personal data is a valuable resource for private and 
public entities. Private parties and public parties have different aims: 
enhancing profit, reducing costs, or making processing of all data more 
efficient by profiling techniques. For instance, many parties including 
physicians, hospitals, insurance companies and governmental health 
authorities may reap considerable financial benefit from the access to medical 
records data bases (e-health records). 
 
Alternatively, protection of fundamental rights including the preservation of 
the integrity of personal life, and protection of personal information as an 
unalienable right for individuals, can also be considered to be important 
governmental goals. Therefore the validity and maintenance of informational 
and personal sovereignty as a fundamental right of civilians must be weighed 
against the interests that are pursued by state authority. The role of 
governmental authorities is, to say the least, ambivalent in this respect. There 
is a positive obligation of the governments to protect the rights of the 
                                                
9 http://www.justitie.nl/actueel/toespraken/archief-
2007/71101privacy.aspx?cp=34&cs=581 
(accessed on 31 August 2009). 
10 U. Sieber, ‘Grenzen des Strafrechts’, Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft (119), 
May 2007, p.25. 
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individuals within the community and the negative obligation to respect 
those rights by not interfering. 
  
This seems to be difficult for state authorities. The availability of personal 
data is almost seen as an invitation to use this data. However, the 
fundamental principles of human rights, as stated in international treaties and 
integrated in national law, should not be easily set aside for reasons that seem 
to be an exception on the merits of informational self-determination. 
Although, as stated by Bodin, there are circumstances in which certain rights 
may be set aside by the sovereign state, this must never be in contradiction 
with a just interpretation of (natural) laws or the result of unjust balancing of 
interests. This is the problem with which we are confronted.  
 
What is the right balance between the fundamental principle of informational 
privacy and the general interest that allows derangement from this, based on 
the exceptions given in international and derived national law? Which 
circumstances allow state authorities to override fundamental principles? 
And, is there a difference in ‘fundamentality’ of human rights in this 
perspective? 
 
Fundamental rights as protection against torture or slavery can be deemed 
absolute, but privacy is a right that, in practice, is considered less 
fundamental weighed against actions by the state. An interesting comparison 
can be made with the view of Westin in 1970 on the aspect of the 
surveillance state as characterisation of the modern totalitarian regime:  
 
“The modern totalitarian state relies on secrecy for the regime, but high 
surveillance and disclosure for all other groups”.11  
 
Privacy is viewed as a kind of individualism that is considered antisocial 
behaviour. 
 
V. Balancing Privacy and Security  
There must be scrutiny on merits based on fundamental human rights, the 
rights of other individuals, and non-discrimination in the sense of summum jus 
summa injuria : what seems to be equal is not always equal. These exceptions 
must be tested against the principles of protecting the informational 
sovereignty of individuals and the necessity to limit this fundamental right in 
light of the measures that have been taken by governmental authorities 
relating to the purpose they want to attain. Important in this view is the 
interpretation of the contextual interrelationship, practical concordance or 
Ordnungszusammenhang12 in this task of balancing (individual) fundamental 
rights and community interests. 
                                                
11 Idem, p. 23, citing Margaret Mead. 
 
12 K.  Hesse, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Heidelberg: C.F. 
Müller, 1995, 20th ed., no. 72 and 317 et seq. Cited and translated by T. Marauhn & N. 
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VI. Discussion of the Dutch ‘Passport Act’ 
A clear example of the shifting balance can be found in the new text of the 
Dutch ‘Passport Act’13, concerning the storage use and processing of 
biometric data. The Dutch senate agreed upon the text without many 
objections. This law is based on the European Council Regulation of 2004 
(‘the Regulation’).14 In the 1970’s, a mass protection against the ‘volkstelling’ 
census because of privacy concerns was still viable, keeping in mind the use 
of personal data by the Germans in the Second World War. In addition, 
there was the fear of ‘automatisation’ as such; what would the government 
do with all these data and how could a civilian ever control the processing of 
these data? In parliament and the senate there was not much discussion 
about the proposals to create a biometric passport based on the Regulation.15 
However, it is surprising that the Dutch law is going further than the 
Regulation. The purpose of the Regulation is solely to verify the authenticity 
of the document and the identity of the holder, although a more extensive 
use by government is not forbidden as such16. But the Dutch government 
saw an opportunity to extend the use of the change that the Regulation 
brought. They added an article in which the purpose of the biometric 
passport was much broader: these data could be used for criminal 
investigations and/or for researching activities that could form a threat 
against the security of the state and other important interests of the 
Netherlands or friendly nations. Further, it was determined that all these data 
should be stored in a data bank  available for non-defined public purposes by 
police and intelligence agencies, without any clear legal limitation for use. 
Germany has strongly denied this central storage for security reasons. But 
other countries such as Belgium, France and Greece are moving towards the 
central data storage and use for public purposes. 
 
Conclusion 
Threats on the security of countries must countered as much as possible, but 
not by all means. The use of personal data by investigative authorities must 
be closely monitored. Criminal law is the most intrusive law in society and 
must be handled with the utmost scrutiny by authorities. Treatment of the 
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Journal L 385, 29 December 2004, pp. 1 – 6. 
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privacy of data subjects should be proportionate to a real threat to the 
interest of society and not based on fear. The seriousness of the crime and 
the phase of the process where these data are handled must be taken into 
consideration. The fundamental right of privacy must be handled with care. 
It is an obligation of the government to protect this principle of the 
democratic society. 
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